From: Rob Thomas <robt@cymru.com>
Subject: Оптимизация TCP/IP стэка для AIX, Solaris, Tru64, HP-UX, Irix, Linux и FreeBSD (eng)
UNIX IP Stack Tuning Guide v2.7
http://www.cymru.com/Documents/ip-stack-tuning.html
By Rob Thomas <robt@cymru.com>
Introduction
The purpose of this document is to strengthen the UNIX IP stack
against a variety of attack types prevalent on the Internet today.
This document details the settings recommended for UNIX servers
designed to provide network intensive services such as HTTP or routing
(firewall services). This document covers the following UNIX variants:
A. IBM AIX 4.3.X
B. Sun Solaris 7
C. Compaq Tru64 UNIX 5.X
D. HP HP-UX 11.0 (research ongoing)
E. Linux kernel 2.2 (tested both SuSE Linux 7.0 and RedHat 7.0)
F. FreeBSD
G. IRIX 6.5.10
Windows NT/2000 will be covered in future releases.
The tuning changes noted below will not remain across reboots. Thus,
these changes should be added to a runtime commands file so that the
changes are enacted at each boot.
AIX - /etc/rc.net
Solaris - /etc/init.d/inetinit
Tru64 UNIX - Use the sysconfigdb or dxkerneltuner command
HP-UX - /etc/rc.config.d/nddconf
Linux kernel 2.2 - /etc/sysctl.conf
FreeBSD - /etc/rc.conf
IRIX - Use the systune command
No tuning steps should be undertaken without a keen insight into the
purpose and effect of such steps. It is assumed that the personnel who
undertake such tuning are well versed in the UNIX kernel with
bit-level understanding of TCP/IP and the RFCs that govern IP
behavior.
Revision History
Version 1.0 - Created the AIX IP stack tuning guide
Version 2.0 - Added Solaris and additional AIX tuning tips, reformated
doc
Version 2.2 - Added ARP tuning tips
Version 2.3 - Added Compaq Tru64 UNIX SYN defense tips
Version 2.4 - Added HP HP-UX 11.0 tuning tips
Version 2.5 - Added Linux and FreeBSD tuning tips
Version 2.6 - Added IRIX 6.5.10 and additional FreeBSD tuning tips
Version 2.7 - Added additional HP-UX 11.0 tuning tips
Credits
This has become a global effort, and this document is made more rich
and valuable thanks to the input of several very helpful folks! Kudos
and lauds for the folks below:
Thanks to the Compaq Software Security Response Team for the Tru64
UNIX SYN flood defense pointers.
For HP-UX 11.0, thanks to Tom Harrold for running ndd over and over at
my every request. :-)
Thanks to Klaus Moeller for a copious collection of Linux tuning tips.
Thanks to Andrew Korty for the FreeBSD tuning tips.
Thanks to Christian Lambert and Alex Icasiano of SGI for the IRIX
tuning tips.
Thanks to Neil Long for the Solaris source route forwarding
correction.
Thanks, as always, to the FIRST (http://www.first.org) community for support, questions,
and feedback.
General IP Stack Tuning Recommendations
1. TCP send and receive spaces
The TCP send and receive spaces directly effect the TCP window size
parameter. An increased window size will allow for more efficient
transfers, particularly bulk transfers such as FTP and HTTP. The
default for each is not optimal, and should be increased to 32768
bytes. This value should not be increased above 64K bytes unless the
implications of RFC1323 and RFC2018 are fully understood and
support for both is enabled.
Do not enable RFC1323 without also enabling support for RFC2018.
Remember, pipe drain is a Bad Thing[tm].
A. AIX
/usr/sbin/no -o tcp_sendspace=32768
/usr/sbin/no -o tcp_recvspace=32768
B. Solaris
/usr/sbin/ndd -set /dev/tcp tcp_xmit_hiwat 32768
/usr/sbin/ndd -set /dev/tcp tcp_recv_hiwat 32768
C. Tru64 UNIX
No tuning recommendations.
D. HP-UX
The TCP send and receive spaces are set to 32768 by default
E. Linux kernel 2.2
While Linux automagically assigns the TCP send and receive
spaces, support for both RFC1323 (large window support,
net.ipv4.tcp_window_scaling) and RFC2018 (SACK support,
net.ipv4.tcp_sack) are enabled by default.
F. FreeBSD
sysctl -w net.inet.tcp.sendspace=32768
sysctl -w net.inet.tcp.recvspace=32768
G. IRIX
The default settings for IRIX are 64Kbytes for both the TCP
send and receive spaces.
2. Socket queue defense against SYN attacks
While great effort is undertaken to defend any network from those with
malicious intent, several ports (largely TCP) must remain open to
conduct business. Internet vandals may attempt to exploit these ports
to launch a denial of service attack. One of the most popular attacks
remains the SYN flood, wherein the socket queue of the attacked host
is overwhelmed with bogus connection requests. To defend against such
attacks, certain UNIX variants maintain separate queues for inbound
socket connection requests. One queue is for half-open sockets (SYN
received, SYN|ACK sent), the other queue for fully-open sockets
awaiting an accept() call from the application. These two queues
should be increased so that an attack of low to moderate intensity
will have little to no effect on the stability or availability of the
server.
A. AIX
/usr/sbin/no -o clean_partial_conns=1
This setting will instruct the kernel to randomly remove
half-open sockets from the q0 queue to make room for new
sockets.
B. Solaris
/usr/sbin/ndd -set /dev/tcp tcp_conn_req_max_q 1024
The q queue holds sockets awaiting an accept() call from the
application.
C. Tru64 UNIX
/sbin/sysconfig -r socket sominconn=65535
The value of sominconn determines how many simultaneous
incoming SYN packets can be handled by the system.
/sbin/sysconfig -r socket somaxconn=65535
The value of somaxconn sets the maximum number of pending TCP
connections.
D. HP-UX
/usr/sbin/ndd -set tcp_syn_rcvd_max 1024
/usr/sbin/ndd -set tcp_conn_request_max 200
E. Linux kernel 2.2
/sbin/sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog=1280
Increases the size of the socket queue (effectively, q0).
/sbin/sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcpsyn_cookies=1
Enables support for TCP SYN cookies, which mitigates the
effectiveness of SYN floods. However, this may cause
performance problems for large windows (see RFC1323 and
RFC2018). To read more about SYN cookies, please review DJ
Bernstein's paper http://cr.yp.to/syncookies.html
F. FreeBSD
sysctl -w kern.ipc.somaxconn=1024
G. IRIX
The listen() queue is hardcoded to 32. However, the system
actually enforces the limit of pending connections as ((3 *
backlog) / 2) + 1. This yields a maximum backlog of 49
connections.
3. Redirects
A miscreant can use IP redirects to modify the routing table on a
remote host. In a well-designed network, redirects to the end stations
should not be required. Both the sending and accepting of redirects
should be disabled.
A. AIX
/usr/sbin/no -o ipignoreredirects=1
/usr/sbin/no -o ipsendredirects=0
B. Solaris
/usr/sbin/ndd -set /dev/ip ip_ignore_redirect 1
/usr/sbin/ndd -set /dev/ip ip_send_redirects 0
C. Tru64 UNIX
No tuning recommendations.
D. HP-UX
/usr/sbin/ndd -set /dev/ip ip_send_redirects 0
E. Linux kernel 2.2
/sbin/sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects=0
/sbin/sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects=0
It is possible for a miscreant to create a resource exhaustion or
performance degredation by filling the IP route cache with bogus ARP
entries. In Solaris, there are two parameters that govern the cleanup
interval for the IP route cache. For unsolicited ARP responses, the
parameter to be tuned is arp_cleanup_interval. In AIX, the cleanup
interval is governed by the value of arpt_killc. However, this
parameter governs both solicited and unsolicited ARP entries. For this
reason, it is likely best to leave the parameter at the default
setting of 20 minutes.
A. AIX
/usr/sbin/no -o arpt_killc=20
B. Solaris
/usr/sbin/ndd -set /dev/arp arp_cleanup_interval 60000
C. Tru64 UNIX
No tuning recommendations.
D. HP-UX
By default set to five minutes.
E. Linux kernel 2.2
No tuning recommendations.
F. FreeBSD
sysctl -w net.link.ether.inet.max_age=1200
G. IRIX
No tuning recommendations.
5. Source routing
With source routing, an attacker can attempt to reach internal IP
addresses - including RFC1918 addresses. It is important to disable
the acceptance of source routed packets to prevent subtle probes of
your internal networks.
A. AIX
/usr/sbin/no -o ipsrcroutesend=0
Disable the sending of source routed packets.
/usr/sbin/no -o ipsrcrouteforward=0
This is important if the box is routing, e.g. a firewall.
Disable this feature to prevent the host from forwarding source
routed packets.
B. Solaris
/usr/sbin/ndd -set /dev/ip ip_forward_src_routed 0
This is important if the box is routing, e.g. a firewall.
Disable this feature to prevent the host from forwarding source
routed packets.
C. Tru64 UNIX
No tuning recommendations.
D. HP-UX
ndd -set /dev/ip ip_forward_src_routed 0
Disable this feature to prevent the host from forwarding source
routed packets.
E. Linux kernel 2.2
/sbin/sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route=0
Drop all source route packets.
/sbin/sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding=0
/sbin/sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.mc_forwarding=0
Do not forward source routed frames.
F. FreeBSD
sysctl -w net.inet.ip.sourceroute=0
sysctl -w net.inet.ip.accept_sourceroute=0
G. IRIX
/usr/sbin/systune ipforward to 2
6. TIME_WAIT setting
On a busy web server, many sockets may linger in the TIME_WAIT state.
This is caused by improperly coded client applications that do not
properly shut down a socket. This can also be used as a type of DDoS
attack.
A. AIX
No tuning recommendations.
B. Solaris
/usr/sbin/ndd -set /dev/tcp tcp_time_wait_interval 60000
This parameter effects the amount of time a TCP socket will
remain in the TIME_WAIT state. The default is quite high for a
busy web server, so it should be lowered to 60000 milliseconds
(60 seconds). The parameter name was corrected in Solaris 7 and
higher. Prior to Solaris 7, the parameter was incorrectly
labeled as tcp_close_wait_interval.
C. Tru64 UNIX
No tuning recommendations.
D. HP-UX
ndd -set /dev/tcp tcp_time_wait_interval 60000
Sockets will linger in TIME_WAIT state no more than 60 seconds.
E. Linux kernel 2.2
/sbin/sysctl -w net.ipv4.vs.timeout_timewait=60
Sockets will linger in TIME_WAIT state for no more than 60
seconds.
F. FreeBSD
No tuning recommendations.
G. IRIX
/usr/sbin/systune tcp_2msl to 60
7. Broadcast ECHO response
Smurf attacks work by sending ICMP 8 0 (ECHO REQUEST) messages to a
broadcast address from a spoofed address. Some IP stacks will respond,
by default, to such messages. This should be disabled. Further, if the
host is a firewall (router), it should not propogate directed
broadcasts.
A. AIX
/usr/sbin/no -o directed_broadcast=0
Do not respond to directed broadcasts.
B. Solaris
/usr/sbin/ndd -set /dev/ip ip_respond_to_echo_broadcast 0
Do not respond to directed broadcasts.
/usr/sbin/ndd -set /dev/ip ip_forward_directed_broadcasts 0
Do not forward directed broadcasts.
C. Tru64 UNIX
No tuning recommendations.
D. HP-UX
ndd -set /dev/ip ip_respond_to_echo_broadcast 0
Do not respond to directed broadcasts.
ndd -set /dev/ip ip_forward_directed_broadcasts 0
Do not forward directed broadcasts.
E. Linux kernel 2.2
/sbin/sysctl -w net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts=1
Do not respond to directed broadcasts.
F. FreeBSD
sysctl -w net.inet.icmp.bmcastecho=0
G. IRIX
/usr/sbin/systune allow_brdaddr_srcaddr to 0
8. Other broadcast probes
There are two other broadcast probes that a miscreant could utilize
against a network. The address mask query can be used to map out the
size of the netblock, and set a range for further probes. The
timestamp broadcast is another means of mapping and fingerprinting
hosts.
A. AIX
/usr/sbin/no -o icmpaddressmask=0
Prevent address mask queries.
B. Solaris
/usr/sbin/ndd -set /dev/ip ip_respond_to_address_mask_broadcast
0
Prevent address mask queries.
G. IRIX
Use ipfilterd to block unwanted ICMP types.
9. Support for RFC1948
This will utilize RFC1948 sequence number generation techniques to
ensure that the initial sequence number for a given TCP socket is very
difficult to guess. This tactic makes IP spoofing significantly more
difficult to accomplish.
B. Solaris
Set TCP_STRONG_ISS=2 in /etc/default/inetinit.
This will require a reboot to take effect.
Vova
